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TRIPS ARTICLE 27.2: AN ARGUMENT FOR CAUTION
M. BRUCE HARPER*
INTRODUCTION
The subject of the interrelationship of free trade with the environment
is well on its way to joining sex, religion, and politics as topics that are barred
from polite conversation. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") highlighted this controversy.' Many detractors
argue that the terms of GATT defeat years of domestic and international
environmental efforts.2 Many supporters believe that GATT is transparent
to such efforts and are surprised at the criticism.' In 1994, the Uruguay
Round officially recognized that there is a relationship between free trade and
environmental quality, and that the relationship merits discussion.
The context is a general mistrust of environmental efforts as a
"pretext for trade protectionism."5 The first proposition of modern trade law
is that liberal international trade is a social good that is "critical to the
enhancement of global welfare."6 The second proposition is that a stifling
protectionism threatens to rob the world of the economic and environmental
"M. Bruce Harper is the Intellectual Property Manager at Old Dominion University. He
holds a B.S.E. in mechanical engineering from Duke University (1984); an M.E.M. from
Old Dominion University (1993); and a J.D. from the College of William and Mary School
of Law (1996). The ideas and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2 See, e.g., Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search
of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992).
1 See After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, 13 Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) S-1, S-3 (Jan. 20, 1995). At this meeting, the Uruguay Round formed the World
Trade Organization's Committee on Trade and the Environment. See Trade and
Environment, Ministerial Decision, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994).
' After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, supra note 4, at S-3.
6 DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 134 (1995).
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advancements enjoyed since the signing of GATT.7 Accordingly, there are
several corollaries concerning social and environmental regulation.
Environmental protection does not inherently require trade restrictions. In
other words, these programs can be crafted in forms that are consistent with
free trade principles (trade-neutral) without harming their effectiveness! In
addition, an expansion of the global economy would free up capital to the
benefit of trade-neutral social and environmental programs.9 If a program is
not effective in a trade-neutral environment, then liberal trade could magnify
the flaws of that program. That is, it is not a fault of GATT that the
effectiveness of a program might depend on a less-than-optimal trade
environment.'0  Thus, GATT is transparent to non-protectionist
environmental efforts. There is little need for GATT to change in order to
accommodate environmental efforts." In very general terms, GATT permits
environmental controls that do not discriminate between domestic and
imported products (the national treatment rule) or imports from different
countries (the most favored nation rule).'"
So when the Uruguay Round addressed the protection of intellectual
property, critics justifiably might have expected little consideration of the
interrelation between intellectual property and environmental protection. The
resulting document, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
See id.
8 See id. More accurately, the programs can be designed to be consistent with provisions
of GATT.
9 See id.
'0 See Benedict Kingsbury, Environment and Trade: The GA 7T/WTO Regime in the
InternationalLegal System, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 189,
193 (A.E. Boyle ed., 1994). Little discussed is the ordering of priorities; for example, why
not protect important social programs for a temporary period? Notably absent is any inquiry
into the distribution of wealth between nations or between individuals. The preeminence of
liberal trade is presumed manifest. This proposition is shown further by the treatment of
exceptions to GATT and the perceived need of the Uruguay Round to re-ratify GATT to
ensure authority over conflicts with earlier international agreements. See infra Part II. Such
a perspective might be more convincing if optimal trade were, in fact, more important than
the avoidance of potentially irreversible environmental hazards.
" See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
32 See Report by the Chairman of the Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade Presented for the Contracting Parties at Their Forty-ninth Session, GATT B.I.S.D.
(40th Supp.) at 79 (1995) (providing a brief, if one-sided, interpretation of GATT's
relationship with environmental controls) [hereinafter GEMIT Report].
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Property Rights ("TRIPS"), 3 provided little surprise. Its purpose is the
harmonization of international intellectual property rights as a step in the
liberalization of trade.'4 To do this, it establishes minimum standards to
which member nations must conform their municipal law. 5 TRIPS
comprises a total of seventy-three articles, with only two paragraphs of one
article touching on environmental issues.'6 Much is unclear. For example,
TRIPS authorizes the patenting of plants and animals, but it fails to discuss
how nations might prevent the destruction of biodiversity. 7 One provision,
Article 27.2, is particularly surprising:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by their law.'"
The words of this clause are vague and raise many practical questions. 9 To
some, this provision is so unclear as to permit protectionist abuse "without
a narrowing interpretation or interpretative statement."2 Nevertheless, one
point is quite clear: member nations have the authority to refuse to grant
'a WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
14 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl. (explaining the desire "to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade").
" See Stephen E. Bondura & Lloyd G. Farr, Intellectual Property Rights Abroad and at
Home After GATT, S.C. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 20.
16 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13.
'7 See id. art. 27.3 ("Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system . . . ."); see also Jennifer Schultz, The
GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 436-37 (1995).
'8 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.2.
19 See Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an
Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 478 (1994).
20 Id.
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patents to environmentally risky inventions.2 Unfortunately, the standard for
this exception is not clear.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether an argument can be
made for the precautionary use of Article 27.2 to protect the environment.
Because-the provision is unclear, its use may be susceptible to challenge by
another member state. The validity of a defense depends on a mixture of
related elements. First, disputes under TRIPS are bound to the resolution
procedures of GATT.22 Disputes under GATT are resolved primarily with
reference to "the relevant GATT provisions," and without reference to
general international law.23 In an apparent effort to extricate GATT further
from the principles of general international law, the Uruguay Round adopted
GATT anew in 1994.24 This measure falls within Articles 31 and 59 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provide that a more recent
treaty takes precedence over a conflicting, older treaty.25 Second, despite the
efforts to segregate GATT disputes from general international law, the
segregation is incomplete. International law speaks to this issue in several
direct and indirect means. Nevertheless, both GATT and international law
support the precautionary use of Article 27.2. GATT provides direct support
by the invocation of precautionary international standards for private
industry. International law plays a lesser role. International law can
influence gap-filling decisions in GATT disputes, the conduct of nations prior
to GATT disputes, and the formation of international standards.26 The limits
21 By definition, the use of Article 27 implies some environmental control over the
invention prior to the "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" of the
invention. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 28; cf Schultz, supra note 17, at 436-37.
22 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 64.
23 See 1 PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATr DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
pt. 2, 12-13 (1995) (citing the 1989 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes as modified by the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994)).
24 See id. pt. 1, at 7.
25 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
arts. 31 & 59, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 624-25 (1990).
26 For example, one clear way general international law might be relevant is in the absence
of conflict with GATT. This could open a dispute to principles from international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
or even the judicial decisions and teachings of qualified publicists. Cf I.C.J. Stat. art. 38,
1, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 79 (Shabtai
Rosenne ed., 1979).
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of such a case may lie in the jurisdictional provisions of GATT. More
generally, nations and GATT panels may find it in their interests to refrain
from challenging well-established international law. Such nuances are
illuminated by a review of relevant, if not facially binding, principles of
international law and municipal law.
Article 27.2 is a rare and limited meeting of three bodies of
international law: patent, trade, and environmental. Unfortunately, the
dispersion of legal authority inhibits graceful organization. Part I will discuss
the policies involved and a scenario for the precautionary use of Article 27.2.
Part II will address the development of international patent law leading to
TRIPS. It will be useful to review how international patent law has become
intertwined with trade law, the standards for GATT decisionmaking and
dispute resolution, and -some of the related environmental issues. This
section will also interpret Article 27.2 in light of other GATT environmental
provisions. Part III presents the ultimate question: what supports the
precautionary use of TRIPS? The answer relies primarily on GATT and
private international standards. Also relevant are the principles of general
international and-municipal law, which may aid a GATT dispute settlement
panel in filling the interpretive gaps of TRIPS.
I. AN EXAMPLE
A dispute under Article 27.2 might arise from differences in how
GATT member states approach environmental risk and patent law. A
hypothetical example of a nation's management of the invention and
international marketing of new chemicals may illustrate this point. As a
gross proposition, environmental law seeks to reduce or control risk through
a wide variety of legal mechanisms.27 For example, if a sovereign is
uncomfortable with the environmental and health risks of new chemicals, it
may require a showing of safety prior to use regardless of the country of
origin. If the sovereign bans chemicals found to be dangerous, the process
may reduce the risk to society at the cost of the showing of safety. The
policy of patent law is likewise cogent: the sovereign who rewards socially
useful inventions will benefit society through more inventions.28 Inherent in
21 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK
ON NATURE LAW AND SOCIETY 1-4 (1992).
28 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2 (1992).
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the rewards offered by patent law is a conversion of property rights. The
inventor gains a right related to the development of the invention, a right that
otherwise would belong to the sovereign or the public.29 Many academics
refer to this conversion as the grant of a monopoly, though in U.S. law and
in TRIPS, it is actually a right to prevent others from making, using, or
selling the invention.30 The result is a market advantage for the life of the
patent. These policies come together in the question at hand: what happens
if a chemical patentee3" from a state that grants patents without regard to the
environmental impact seeks a patent from a second state that requires a
showing of environmental safety?
Under the language of Article 27.2, the second state appears to have
the authority to reject a risky patent on the grounds of a precautionary
domestic law.32 The starting point of the analysis is the statutory definition
of patentable subject matter. TRIPS offers a liberal definition of patentable
subject matter.33 Then, Article 27.2 excepts subject matter that risks harm to
"human, animal or plant life or health" or "serious prejudice to the
environment."3 Conceivably, a nation could reject classes of chemicals it
believed to pose an unacceptable risk to its citizens. For a more considered
approach, a nation might evaluate the safety of individual chemicals. This
less severe reaction would require the inventor to satisfy a preliminary
showing of safety, giving the nation an opportunity for control prior to the
"making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" of the invention.35
Thus, a nation could pursue controls ranging from an absolute, per se
rejection of classes of chemicals considered to be dangerous, to a case-by-
case evaluation of new chemicals, to an unquestioning acceptance of all
subject matter. Left unanswered is the question of whether some inventions
might pose such a risk.
29 See id.
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 28.
31 The fictional patentee or inventor in this example includes a corporate employer who
usually holds the patent by assignment from the actual inventor under the terms of the
employment agreement.
32 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.
31 See id.; see generally Steve Chamovitz, The Regulation of Environmental Standards
by International Trade Agreements, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 631 (Aug. 25,
1993).
"' TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.2.
31 Id. art. 28.
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Chemicals pose an uncertain risk to health and the environment; their
effects are poorly understood. Indeed, chemicals or mixtures of chemicals
compose everything in the environment.36 In total, science recognizes about
seven million different chemicals. 3" The world economy consumes about
eighty thousand of those chemicals, with industry introducing a thousand new
chemicals each year.38  This widespread use of chemicals spreads the
uncertain risk throughout the world.39 Patent law encourages the
development of new chemicals by giving industry a market advantage. Yet
the social and economic benefit of these chemicals frequently is much better
known than the potential harm. Nations vary in their efforts to predict which
of these new chemicals will be dangerous to humans and the environment.4'
The fear of some, as a recent U.S. General Accounting Office report noted,
is that "[flor many chemicals, there is little knowledge of the ill-effects they
might cause to people and the environment exposed to them."41 In March of
1996, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences held a conference on the
subject of "whether common synthetic chemicals, many of them ubiquitous
in mundane household and industrial products, reduce the ability of humans
to reproduce, fight off disease and develop normal cognition and behavior."'42
Chief among the issues discussed was the widespread marketing and use of
many chemicals for which the effect on humans and the environment is
admittedly unknown. 3 Most of these chemicals are, or were, protected by
patents in one or more nations, giving the inventor an exclusive right to the
36 See Linda L. Black-Covilli, Basic Environmental Chemistry of Hazardous and Solid
Wastes, in FUNDAMENTALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 13-14 (Porter-
C. Knowles ed., 1992).
" See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TOxIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT-LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES COULD MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE 8 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
38 See id.
9 The chemical industry accounted for $379 billion of world trade in 1994. See WORLD
TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 1995 TRENDS AND STATISTICS 95 (1995).
0 See id. See infra Part III.B.3.b. for a discussion of the variety of national environmental
controls used regarding the introduction of new chemicals.
4' GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 8.
42 Michael Waldholz, Scientists Debate the Future Threat of Common Chemicals, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 10, 1996, at A17.
"' See id. One EPA researcher noted, "There is a legitimate need to study the impact of
these [synthetic] chemicals beyond the usual, more easily detectable impacts... although
exactly how dangerous and widespread is the danger simply is not known." Id.
1997] 387
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development of the chemical."
The nature of this risk commends precaution. Uncertainty prevents
science from prescribing an optimal balance between safety and economic
exploitation. In fact, scientists disagree even as to the minimum necessary
toxicological tests.45 Nevertheless, the risk has led many nations to adopt
some form of pre-manufacture or pre-market control of chemical
compounds." The reasons are quite clear. First, a reactive or tort-type law
is unsatisfactory to prevent the harm imposed by an unsafe, but commonly
used chemical as in the Bhopal Incident.47 For this reason, tort law by itself
is an inadequate guard against uncertainty.48 Second, pre-market control is
the point in the life of the product which enables the greatest risk avoidance
for the least cost:
Once the production process is completed, the product created
may itself pose a risk to the environment. The product may
be dangerous for its intended use, threatening the health or
safety of its user or bystanders, or its use may have
undesirable side effects upon the environment, as by the
emission of chemical substances which disturb some element
of the food chain or the atmosphere. Finally, disposal of the
product may be difficult or hazardous, giving rise to problems
of waste management.49
Thus, the nature of the risk endorses some measure of pre-market controls,
as recognized by TRIPS Article 27.2.
In practice, nations may find several reasons for coordinating
precautionary control with patent law. First, a nation may desire to
4 See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD J-6 (Alan J. Jacobs ed., 1996).
4S See Black-Covilli, supra note 36, at 40-41.
46 See infra Part III.
47 See Molly Moore, Bhopal Gas Leak Victims Caught in Cycle of Despair, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1993, at Al. Following the disaster, India passed a precautionary statute. See
PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 997 n. 1.
48 See MARTIN A. MATTES, PREMARKET TESTING OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS: A MEANS
OF CONTROLLING UNRECOGNIZED ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 58 (1977).
9 Id. at 12. Note there is a difference between pre-manufacture and pre-market controls.
The choice of control is not a matter of concern here, so the term "pre-market control" refers
to both methods.
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discourage the use of risky, but innovative products within its territory.
Indeed, the positive effects of an invention are inseparable from its negative
effects. For example, it is easy to conceive of an invention that offers a great
social benefit aside from its intense hazard. Yet if the product presents a risk
to society, then that risk bears a social cost. For that invention, there is a less
compelling argument for the sovereign to encourage economic exploitation.
Congruently, there is a lesser interest in rewarding the inventor. Second, a
nation simply may wish to use the grant of a market advantage offered by a
patent to encourage a greater level of pre-market testing and disclosure by
industry. Third, it makes sense for a sovereign to coordinate its grants and
its regulations. To isolate the decision to control from the decision to reward
invites competition between the two policies and weakens both. Otherwise,
a nation might find itself in the ambivalent position of rewarding an inventor
for a highly dangerous invention, which may require intense and expensive
safety measures even if the invention offers only marginal utility. In order
for those safety measures to be effective, they would need to correct not only
the market failure or economic externalities that encourages polluting, but
also the market advantage the state provided in the form of a patent.5"
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW LEADING TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. Before TRIPS
Before TRIPS, the preeminent authority pertaining to international
patent law was the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property."' A brief history of this document will provide background for a
discussion of TRIPS. The Paris Convention arose from the Congress of
Vienna for Patent Reform in 1873.52 This Congress addressed
inconsistencies in national patent laws and the need for international reform.53
Such a need had not been articulated until the 1873 International Exposition
' See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
In other words, the patent, which was erroneously granted based on an assumption of
positive social utility, would pose an additional externality for the environmental regulation
to correct or overcome.
"I Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revision, July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
52 See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS § 45 (1975).
53 See id.
1997] 389
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
at Vienna. Austria-Hungary intended the exposition to provide a forum for
the exhibition of recent inventions in a variety of technologies. Yet many
foreign inventors feared that the restrictive Austrian patent laws would
provide little protection for them. Austria was forced to respond by passing
a temporary law protecting the exhibiting inventors and removing
discrininatory procedural requirements.' Thus, the exhibition was a timely
setting for patent specialists to form a congress to discuss patent reform."
The next international exposition in 1878 similarly hosted the second
meeting: the International Congress on Industrial Property at Paris.56 The
product of this congress was the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of March 20, 1883. 5' This document was the parent of the
modem Paris Convention, which is recognized by TRIPS.5"
Two substantive themes of the Paris Convention were national
treatment and harmonization.59 The principle of national treatment requires
each member to grant the same protection to member applicants that it
provides to its own national applicants. The Paris Convention advanced
national treatment by the recognition of a common filing date, which could
protect an inventor's priority of invention in foreign member nations.'0
Harmonization is the establishment of a common set of legal principles with
which the member states must comply. The Paris Convention cautiously
began the trend of harmonization by setting some modest rules for the
protection of patents and industrial designs and common procedures for the
recognition of international filing priority.6 Some critics faulted the Paris
Convention for providing too little substantive protection for inventors.
62
However, it did mark the birth of concepts for intellectual property protection
that survive in both GATT and TRIPS.
The TRIPS Agreement arose largely due to the increasing importance
of intellectual property rights to U.S. trade. Over the last twenty-five years,
innovative technology, creative works, and famous consumer names have
Seeid. § 44 &n.1.
5 See id. § 45.
See id. § 46.
5 See id. §48.
5 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2.
5 See 1 LADAS, supra note 52, § 174.
o See Paris Convention, supra note 51, art. 4.
61 See id. arts. 4-5.
62 See 1 LADAS, supra note 52.
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become more important to the U.S. export economy; intellectual property law
seeks, among other things, to protect these creative products.6' The United
States became concerned that the weak intellectual property rights under the
Paris Convention could allow piracy and infringement to erode its trade
advantage.6' In response, the United States insisted that the issue of
intellectual property rights be placed on the 1986 agenda for the Uruguay
Round of GATT Negotiations.65
This proposal pulled the subject of intellectual property out of its
historically isolated realm in international law and placed it within the realm
of international trade law. For the United States, GATT was the appropriate
forum because its primary function is the liberalization of international
trade.6 The United States estimated that it suffered an annual trade loss of
$60 billion because of the weakness of international intellectual property
protection.67 This posed a significant distortion in the natural balance of
trade. At the time, however, some nations disagreed that the Uruguay Round
should be extended to include intellectual property issues.6' Nevertheless, the
parties to the Uruguay Round acceded to the U.S. request.69 TRIPS is the
first multinational agreement to address in depth issues such as the scope of
international intellectual property rights, the means to enforce those rights,
dispute resolution, the applicability of earlier international agreements, and
transitional arrangements.70 As of December 1995, twenty-six of the 107
countries in GATT accepted the Uruguay Round.7
B. GA7T
GATT is made up of a General Agreement and various side
63 See Doane, supra note 19, at 465.
' See id. at 466-67.
65 See id.
6 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 8 ("The General Agreement was
intended to implement and protect the results of tariff reductions that had been agreed upon
during the I[ntemational] T[rade] O[rganization] negotiations.").
67 See Doane, supra note 19, at 466 (citing U.S.I.T.C., PUB. No. 2065, REP. TO THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988)).
68 See id. at 466-67.
69 See id.
71 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl.
"' See Bondura & Farr, supra note 15, at 20.
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agreements, with the General Agreement covering most aspects of
restrictions on the trade of goods and ancillary issues." Some of the many
side agreements include the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"),73
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), 74 TRIPS, and the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 75 The
WTO oversees international economic relations in the execution of GATT.76
It operates by consensus, although the following issues require a super-
majority vote: the adoption of interpretations of the agreements, 77 the waiver
of obligations in "exceptional circumstances,' 7 and a limited amendment
function. 79 The foundation of GATT policy lies in the most favored nation
rule" and the national treatment rule."' These rules require member nations
to forbear from conduct that discriminates between domestic and imported
products (the national treatment rule) or between imports from different
countries (the most favored nation rule). The Uruguay Round added several
of the side agreements, such as the DSU and TRIPS Agreement, and refined
the national treatment and most favored nation rules.
At the Uruguay Round, the forces supporting free trade tended to
7 GATT, supra note 1; see 1 PESCATORE.ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 7. GATT often
is used to refer to both the total system of agreements and the General Agreement alone.
" Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (describing the procedure for dispute
resolution).
14 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
71 WTO Agreement, supra note 1.
76 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 7-8, 12-13.
" This is presumably a post hoc, but limited, interpretation of intent. See id. at 13.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 13-14; see also Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 207.
80 GATT, supra note 1, art. I.
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports . . .any
advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
S GATT, supra note 1, art. III ("The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws .... ").
392 [Vol. 21:381
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expand the reach of GATT. In support of harmonization, the members put
into effect the complicated agreements on the Technical Barriers to Trade
("TBT") and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards.' The TBT is of primary
concern here. It comes into effect when a state seeks to apply a domestic
standard, environmental or otherwise, to an imported product. 3 For imports,
the TBT requires either the use of "relevant international standards"" or a
domestic standard that passes the "least restrictive" test, defined as "not...
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. ' 5
Legitimate objectives include the "protection of human, animal, or plant life
or health, and protection of the environment."" When a nation uses an
international standard, it gains a rebuttable presumption of consistency with
the TBT. 7 Generally, a nation should be able to show a scientific basis for
using a domestic standard different from an international standard." Without
valid justification, a nation may use a non-TBT domestic standard if it is
willing to risk a ruling by the WTO that the standard is illegal and to subject
itself to tariffs.89
The Uruguay Round also changed the terms of dispute resolution
under GATT. A typical GATT dispute might allege trade discrimination in
violation of the national treatment rule. Early procedures offered a
preliminary phase in which the parties could request a consultation in order
to resolve the dispute informally.' ° If this failed, the complaining party could
resort to the body of GATT members.9" The membership was then required
to investigate the complaint and arrive at a resolution by consensus. If no
members objected (vetoed), then the punishment could include a loss of
" Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 8 (1979)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement]; see Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and
Environmental Supervision, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 89 (Jan. 26, 1994). The
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures addresses food safety and disease
prevention. See id.
s See Charnovitz, supra note 82.
TBT Agreement, supra note 82, art. 2.4.
KS Id. art. 2.2.
• Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 213.
87 See id.; Charnovitz, supra note 82.
8 See Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 213; Charnovitz, supra note 82.
89 See Charnovitz, supra note 82.
o See GATI', supra note 1, art. XXII.
91 See id. art. XXIII.
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GATT concessions.92 This awkward procedure proved frustrating.93 The
Tokyo Round in 1979 started a reformation of the dispute process, but
retained much of the awkwardness, including the requirement of a
consensus.94 The Uruguay Round brought drastic change to GATT dispute
resolution.95 Formal disputes are now resolved by dispute settlement panels,
access to which is guaranteed; the panel reports become final unless there is
a consensus to reject.96 The DSU streamlines punishment as well.97
In a dispute, the one source of binding legal authority is GATT.9" As
stated in the DSU, a dispute settlement panel "cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."99 The GATT
provisions include the General Agreement and the side agreements, such as
TRIPS."° The complaining member identifies the initial, relevant terms of
reference, although a dispute settlement panel may refer to any GATT
provision."' If there is a conflict between a general and a side agreement, the
side agreement takes precedence.'0 2 WTO interpretations and the decisions
of the members provide a source of persuasive but non-binding GATT law. 3
The decisions of the members may include earlier dispute settlement panel
reports. 04
Can a dispute settlement panel, which apparently is limited to the
provisions of GATT, ever consider other public international law? Putting
aside the case where there is a direct conflict between other international law
92 See id.
91 See Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative
Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 202-04 (1995).
94 See id.
9' See DSU, supra note 73.
9 See id. arts. 6.1, 16.4.
9' See id. art. 22.6.
9' See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23.
99 DSU, supra note 73, art. 3.2.
"00 See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXXIV; 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 18-
21.
'o' See 1 PESCATORE ETAL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 12-13.
"02 See id. pt. 1, at 18 (citing WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex IA, general
interpretive note, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994)).
103 See GATI', supra note 1, art. XXXIV; I PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 18-
21. Dispute settlement panel reports are not binding law for cases not involving the same
parties. See id. at 20.
'04 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 19-20.
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and GATT, °5 the first hurdle is jurisdictional. That is, the preliminary
question is whether the dispute could be resolved solely on the basis of trade
issues.' °6 If not, such a dispute might present a conflict arising from the
vagueness of the relevant GATT provisions. Is there any mechanism for a
dispute settlement panel to choose an interpretation that accords with public
international law? Perhaps in this narrow case. Such gap-filling falls short
of a change in rights and obligations while advancing predictability and
security."°7 Further, dispute settlement panels have the ability to consult with
a variety of non-GATT experts.10 8 Yet to date, no dispute settlement panel
has referred to the rules of general international law."° On the other hand,
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention does appear to have guided the decisions
of some dispute settlement panels."' Article 31 could allow contextual
consideration of subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and "any
relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the
parties.""' This could provide a direct role for general international law in
a GATT dispute; undoubtedly, such a proposition could be challenged." 2
Nevertheless, it would be consistent with GATT.
C. TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement addresses many of the inadequacies of earlier
international patent law. With this remedial intent, the United States
advanced the proposal for TRIPS in 1987 and carried it through to the
Uruguay Round in 1989.1 3 Perhaps the primary achievement of TRIPS is its
relationship with GATT, which enabled the application of the national
treatment and most favored nation rules to the trade aspects of intellectual
105 The subject of conflict between GATT and public international law is addressed infra
Part III.B.
'06 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 2, at 26 & n.47.
107 See DSU, supra note 73, art. 3.2.
loS See Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 225.
'09 See I PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 2, at 26.
"0 See id. Article 31 is the General Rule of Interpretation for treaties.
.. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 31.3; see Kingsbury,
supra note 10, at 217-27.
1' See Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 226-27 n.97 (citing the Tuna-Dolphin Case (Mex. v.
U.S.), Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Case]).
113 See Getlan, supra note 93, at 173.
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property." 4 Substantively, TRIPS provided a minimum set of standards to
which member nations must conform their intellectual property law."5 Many
of these standards were the product of a coordinated effort to fill the gaps in
international patent law left by the Paris Convention." 6 Some of the major
changes include a broad definition of patentable subject matter," 7 a
prohibition of discrimination by the place of origin,"8I a uniform patent term
of twenty years from filing," 9 and sanctioned importing. 120 An additional
concern of the United States was dispute resolution. Accordingly, TRIPS
accepts the dispute resolution mechanisms of GATT. 2'
D. GATT and Environmental Issues
Some of the recent environmental issues associated with GATT
include the potential disruption of multilateral environmental agreements, 22
whether U.S. laws protecting extra-territorial dolphins were consistent with
GATT (Tuna-Dolphin Case), 123 the validity of U.S. gas guzzler taxes and
corporate average fuel economy requirements, 124 and whether unilateral
environmental measures affecting trade in general will survive GATT.125 The
most far-reaching of concerns is the first, whether the trade-oriented
provisions of GATT will eviscerate the already weak enforcement
mechanisms of public environmental law. 126 The issue that is of greatest
consequence to environmentalists is how GATT affects environmental
" See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 3-4.
"t See id. art. 1.
116 See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 351-52 (1995).
"' See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.1.
"i See id.
"1 See id. arts. 27, 28, 33.
,20 See id. art. 28.1. In some nations, importing was considered a form of patent abuse by
failure to work the patent in the importing nation.
121 See id. art. 64.
', See Steve Chamovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GA TT Rules and Their Application
to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299 (1994).
123 See Tuna-Dolphin Case, supra note 112.
'u See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the United States Taxes on Automobiles, Oct.
11, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994); Steve Chamovitz, The GAIT Panel Decision on
Automobile Taxes, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 921 (Nov. 2, 1994).
125 See Chamovitz, supra note 82.
126 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 433-34.
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agreements that use trade measures.
Some critics question GATT's hostility to international environmental
law. GATT supporters posit that the "gains from trade are real and are
distributed among all the participants," including environmental efforts.127
Yet many of the major impediments to trade remain unchallenged, 2 in
contrast to the minor impediments posed by environmental laws. 2 9 Indeed,
even the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade
reported that, "few of the more than 150 M[ultilateral] E[nvironmental]
A[greement]s negotiated to date contain any trade provisions."'30
Nevertheless, the treaty date of GATT was reset from 1947 to 1994, enabling
it to "leapfrog" in priority over all environmental treaties, which under
international law's "more recent treaty" rule would have trumped GATT on
environmental issues.1 3'
GATT defenders have responded that "the considerable extent to
which the GATT rules already accommodate trade measures used in
conjunction with environmental policies to protect national environmental
resources" obviates the need for refinement.'32  As noted above,
environmental efforts that observe the national treatment and most favored
nation rules are quite likely to survive scrutiny under GATT. In addition, the
General Agreement provides an exception from these rules in Article XX for
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health," or
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption."'133 As a recent report by the GATT Group of Environmental
Measures and International Trade3 4 argued:
There is wide agreement in the Group that GATT does not
prevent any contracting party from adopting appropriate
domestic environmental policies by providing countries with
127 1 PESCATORE ET AL, supra note 23, at vii.
128 See l id.
,29 See Charnovitz, supra note 122, at 350-52.
330 GEMIT Report, supra note 12, at 78.
131 See Charnovitz, supra note 82, at 91.
132 GEMIT Report, supra note 12, at 77-78.
133 GAT', supra note 1, art. XX (b), (g).
134 This group is a non-negotiating contracting party group that is subordinate to
the Committee.
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very considerable scope to use trade-related policies to protect
national environmental resources without calling into
question their GATT obligations .... In addition, recourse
can be taken to the provisions of Article XX of the GATT in
exceptional circumstances. These provisions permit a
contracting party to apply trade measures which could
otherwise be considered inconsistent with its GATT
obligations but which are felt to be necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or which relate to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. However, such
measures must not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries .... Checks
and balances ... are needed as essential safeguards against
protectionist abuse, which would be as detrimental to the
environmental agenda as to trade, and to avoid unduly
disturbing the balance of rights and obligations accruing to
contracting parties from the GATT system.' 3
If it is accepted that environmental programs can and should be crafted in a
trade neutral fashion, the problem posed is minor.
Even if GATT suffers the existence of environmental efforts, it may
promote a downward harmonization in environmental law to the most lax,
generally accepted standard.'36 There is simply no source of authority within
GATT for weighing environmental issues with trade issues. GATT contains
"only a politically limited and arduous process for making new rules, and a
system of dispute settlement and supervision that has not hitherto been
environment-oriented or as open as environmentalists wish."'1 37 Nevertheless,
there exists an extensive body of substantive, international environmental law
in apparent conflict with GATT, which augurs a greater problem. Consider
how the United States might fare under GATT if in response to harmful
transboundary pollution from the Trail Smelter, it banned the importation of
the metals produced there."' The ultimate relationship between trade and
... GEMIT Report, supra note 12, at 79.
136 See generally VOGEL, supra note 6, at 141-49 (describing the "Delaware effect").
1' Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 191.
... See id. at 216-17 (citing the Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1911
(1941)).
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environmental law remains both unsettled and unsettling.'
The TRIPS Agreement also has spawned controversy over
environmental issues. Article 27 raises a number of environmental questions
in addition to those raised by paragraph 2. The concern over paragraph 3
centers on issues of morality, conservation, and the preservation of
biodiversity. This provision permits member nations to exclude "diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods"'"' and seems to leave unresolved the
question of patenting genetic material, defined as "plants and animals other
than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes."t4' Related topics
include the morality of patenting pharmaceuticals, 42 medical methods, and
genetic material. 43  One environmental concern is that TRIPS might
encourage a rush to exploit, and likely destroy, biodiversity in developing
nations that formerly did not allow the patenting of genetic material."a South
American nations may find themselves to be the host, by virtue of TRIPS, of
a genetic marketplace; the profits for transnational pharmaceutical companies
could be enormous and arguably, unhealthful. 45  The loss of genetic
biodiversity may depend more on how well drug companies share their
profits with the host nation than on scientific principles of preservation. 46
In this respect, the vague language of TRIPS offers little help; one suggested
remedy is to revise Article 27.3 in order to reward sound environmental
management and preservation in addition to exploitation. 47
139 See Goldman, supra note 2.
240 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.3(a).
141 Id. art. 27.3(b). See generally Chamovitz, supra note 82, at 92 (stating that "[a]nimals
may be excluded from the WTO patent requirements, but plant varieties must be legally
secured either through patents or an alternative system").
242 See Rana Gosain & Henry K. Sherrill, Despite TRIPS, the PTO Is Not Granting Drug
or Food Patents-So Why File?, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Oct. 31, 1995, available in
1995 WL 10426914.
243 See generally Schultz, supra note 17.
'4 See id. at 436.
145 See id.
" See Julia Preston, A Biodiversity Pact with a Premium, WASH. POST, June 9, 1992, at
A16.
247 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 436-37 (arguing that these issues should be included in
the future GATT/WTO work program on the environment).
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E. GATT Article XX as an Analogyfor Interpreting TRIPS Article 27.2
An examination of the use of GATT Article XX may illuminate the
discussion of TRIPS Article 27.2. As mentioned above, Article XX exempts
from compliance with the principles of GATT, those measures that are:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic or archeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption .... 148
There are many difficulties in drawing this analogy, but there are also some
arguments in its favor. The simple terms of GATT force a first order, or
preliminary analysis of whether national conduct is facially GATT compliant,
regardless of other issues. Indeed, this is a jurisdictional question. 49 Thus,
GATT divides conduct into three categories: GATT compliant, GATT
deviant, and GATT Article XX excepted. In this respect, the analogy may
hold. Article 27 of TRIPS can be seen as dividing a nation's treatment of
patentable subject matter into three categories: compliant with the broad
grant of TRIPS, TRIPS deviant, or TRIPS Article 27 excepted. In some
parts, the language is similar.' Further, GATT would treat both deviant
categories as impermissibly protectionist.
However, difficulties abound. Fundamentally, the two articles relate
to their respective documents differently. Article XX removes the obligation
for general compliance with the fundamental policies of GATT when a state
seeks affirmative conduct matching the exceptions. Article 27.2 removes the
obligation of a sovereign to respond to a request for an affirmative grant. A
dispute under Article 27.2 is more likely to constitute gap-filling than
"' GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
141 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23.
"s For example, both exceptions must be "necessary." See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX;
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.2.
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interpretation, as have many of the Article XX cases.'. Prior to any grant of
patentable subject matter in TRIPS is the cautionary phrase "[s]ubject to the
provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3."'' 52 The exception is limited to the term
"patentable subject matter," which is a statutory tool for defining the types
of inventions that can be patented.'53 For TRIPS, this is the primary inquiry
into whether an invention merits national treatment. Therefore the first step
is the satisfaction of the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3. The second step
is a presumption of patentability that merits national treatment. The grant
that follows is affirmative: "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application."' 5 4 It is the exception, which frames the grant of patentable
subject matter, that allows member nations to exclude from national
treatment certain categories of inventions. In contrast, Article XX is a
separate article that presents a general exception to all the obligations of the
General Agreement. Further, it is conceivable that TRIPS Article 27.2 could
be read to conflict with GATT Article XX in both terms of obligation and
wording. In that case, Article 27.2 would govern. 55
Assuming the analogy, this interpretation would produce a narrow but
viable exception to patentable subject matter. In general, a party claiming an
exception under Article XX must show necessity for the conduct.5 6 This
entails a showing that the affirmative conduct is no more restrictive than
GATT consistent alternatives-that is, the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with GATT.'57 In such a case, a dispute settlement panel is to
construe Article XX narrowly.' On the other hand, a uniformly applied
's' For a discussion of the application of GATr to environmental measures, see
Charnovitz, supra note 122.
152 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.1.
5 Cf MERGES, supra note 28, at 42-45.
'u TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.1.
1 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 18 (citing WTO Agreement, supra
note 1, Annex IA, general interpretive note). Conflict in wording might arise over any
difference in wording, such as "serious prejudice to the environment."
'* See WORLD TRADE ORG., GATr, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATr LAW AND
PRACTICE 563 (6th ed. 1995).
,s See id. at 566-67, 575.
358 See id. at 563.
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standard that satisfies generally accepted scientific principles may survive. 5 9
In such a case, a GATT panel may look to expert information provided by
non-GATT organizations.' Consider the hypothetical from above involving
the import of a new chemical. Assume that the receiving nation provided a
valid, scientific justification for setting a standard of unacceptable risk,
moderate regulations, and a universal, good faith applicability that is
otherwise GATT compliant. In such a case, the precautionary use of TRIPS
Article 27.2 might survive a test of narrow interpretation similar to that
accorded to GATT Article XX.
At this point, the procedural aspects are worth noting. GATT Article
XX is primarily a defensive measure raised in disputes. 6' In contrast, the
exercise of Article 27.2 could implicate other parts of TRIPS prior to a
dispute. Article 29 requires inventors to disclose information about an
invention "in a manner sufficiently clear and complete" for enablement, or
simple exercise of the invention. 62 A nation also may impose "reasonable
procedures and formalities" as long as they are consistent with TRIPS.'63
Opponents may raise the argument that because a disclosure of environmental
impact is not explicit in Article 29, it is inconsistent. However, because
Article 27.2 is discretionary, the disclosure requirement should not be
included in a generally applicable requirement for patentability. Instead, it
is better accommodated as a conditional "reasonable procedure." Moreover,
that objection itself would be inconsistent with the plain language of Article
29.2. As will be seen below, such an objection may also prove difficult in
view of the TBT and international law. In short, TRIPS envisions Article
27.2 as an intermediate tool of environmental control. Thus, a requirement
of a pre-market showing of safety could satisfy GATT if it observes the TBT,
national treatment rule, and most favored nation rule.
III. WHAT SUPPORTS A PRECAUTIONARY USE OF ARTICLE 27.2?
In the context of international trade and environmental law, it is
1S9 See id. at 566-68 (citing 1990 Panel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200
(1991)).
, See id.
161 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 122, at 323.
162 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 29.1.
163 id. art. 62.1.
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useful to identify two loose categories: public and private."6 Typical public
international law comprises binding legal agreements or treaties between
states, such as GATT or the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident.'65 Industry developed standards, such as those produced by the
International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), fall into the category
of private law.'66 Because GATT, through the TBT, has adopted aspects of
private law as municipal law, the two categories may overlap. This
phenomenon has arisen with the European Community's official recognition
of international standards.'67 In the case at hand, both public and private
international law support the precautionary use of Article 27. GATT
incorporates private industrial standards that support information access and
responsible life cycle management. This is a direct support. International
and municipal law play a more modest role. In disputes, non-GATT law may
be relevant to show subsequent dealings between the parties, customs, or
generally accepted principles of conduct. 6 In addition, it may shape the
scope of the dispute indirectly. These indirect effects may range from
guiding the requirements of ISO standards to a dispute settlement panel's
consideration of comparative municipal solutions.169
A. The Technical Barriers to Trade and Article 27.2
GATT requires this interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2 through a
two-step argument. First, as discussed above, the TBT creates a rebuttable
presumption supporting the use of international industrial standards. Second,
'6 See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International
Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment,
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479 (1995).
"' Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, opened for signature Sept.
26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986); see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 480-85; see generally
HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 34-35 (1994).
66 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 486-88; see generally Kerry E. Rodgers, The ISO
Environmental Standards Initiative, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1996) (discussing ISO
14000).
167 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 168) 1 (regulating the
European Union Environmental Management and Audit System).
168 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 31.3; Kingsbury,
supra note 10, at 217-27.
169 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 2, at 26 & n.46.
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the international standards of widest applicability endorse product life cycle
management, pollution prevention, and product impact disclosure. This two-
step argument clearly supports a nation that requires a showing of safety prior
to manufacture. The national patent proponent who objects faces the burden
of rebutting a presumption of compliance with the TBT in the dispute
settlement proceedings.
The primary source of international standards is the ISO. The ISO
includes over one hundred nations, which are represented by their most
representative industrial-standard-setting organizations. 70 The ISO objective
is to advance international trade through standardization.' 7' Accordingly, the
ISO has issued thousands of standards for industrial fields ranging from
mechanical engineering to information technology.'72 These standards are,
by themselves, voluntary. Yet when a GATT member uses an international
standard, it raises a presumption of compliance with the TBT. 173 A major
attraction these standards hold for GATT is that they provide a ready,
industry-accepted, form of harmonization.'
The first ISO series to approach the issue of environmental protection
was ISO 9000.' This standard introduced the concept of managing a
product's life cycle, from the recognition of a market need to the ultimate
disposal at the end of use. 7 6 When developing a product, the ISO 9000
manufacturer should consider the ultimate disposal to be an important aspect
of the product's quality. Effective quality control includes identifying the
disposal requirements (scientific and legal), ensuring that disposal capacity
is available, and communicating this to the consumer.'77 The consumer
expects safe usage and disposal, and the manufacturer should be confident
that "output actually meets customer expectations.' ' 78  Yet the total
environmental message is somewhat general and oblique. A clearer message
170 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 489.
171 See PERRY L. JOHNSON, ISO 9000: MEETING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
6(1993).
172 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 490.
171 See id. at 518-20.
171 See id. at 488.
171 See FRANK VOEHL ET AL., ISO 9000: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR SMALL TO MID-
SIZED BUSINESSES 156-59 (1994).
176 See id.
177 See JOHNSON, supra note 171, at 49-53.
78 Id. at 51.
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of caution in ISO 9000 is the requirement for product safety. ISO 9000
requires facilities to "identify all safety aspects of the quality of output," "test
output for effectiveness of safety measures," and "institute output traceability
to ensure effective recall."' 7 9 The objective is to treat safety and product
liability as a "special category of critical quality characteristics."' 8 ° A fair
reading of these requirements certainly would include environmental
responsibility for a pre-market showing of safety.
ISO 14000, some parts of which were due in 1996, promises an even
broader, holistic approach to environmental protection. 8' In general, these
standards address environmental management systems, labeling, auditing, life
cycle assessment, performance evaluation, and product standards.'82 In ISO
14000, there is a very definite trend towards risk avoidance, pollution
prevention, responsible management, and information availability. 8 3 In
particular, ISO 14041 through 14044 advance the message that a corporation
should exercise environmental control of a product's life. 84 This "life cycle
analysis" includes a study of the environmental impacts at every step, an
assessment of the associated risks, and an effort to minimize those risks. 5
This module of the standard is due to be complete between 1997 and 1998.
Nevertheless, one principle is consistent. The identification and
communication of environmental and health risks at all stages of a product's
life is critical.' 86
A tangential, but misleading controversy has arisen over performance
evaluations. Some of the early proposals required extensive publication of
the environmental impacts of industrial operations.'87 In the United States,
the fear arose that an informed public might not tolerate a polluting industry
that was otherwise desirable; in particular, industry concern focused on the
79 Id. at 91.
180 Id. at 92.
181 See ISO Standards Would Encourage Compliance with Environmental Standards,
Official Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 283 (June 10, 1994).
182 See generally W. LEE KUHRE, ISO 14001 CERTIFICATION: ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1995). Information about ISO 14000 also may be found at the
Internet web site <http://es.inel.gov/partners/iso/iso.html>.
,83 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 516-17.
184 See KUHRE, supra note 182, at 31-32.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 171-73.
187 See id. at 67.
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publication of toxic releases from operations.' On that subject, U.S.
industry has pushed through a measure in ISO 14000 for the confidentiality
of this information.'89 This confidentiality requirement has little bearing on
the subject of life cycle analysis.
B. Principles of Non-GA TT Law: General International Law
1. Introduction
Public international law supports this application of Article 27.2. As
mentioned above, because GATT is more recent than multilateral
environmental treaties, many consider that it preempts general international
law. 90 Even if it does, this does not mean that the environmental treaties
have no role. The international principle of precaution and the need for
coordination of development with environmental control can influence GATT
decisionmaking directly and indirectly.' 9' The general municipal acceptance
of pre-market disclosures and patentable subject matter limitations also can
influence a GATT dispute settlement panel.'92 First, when there is no clear
contradiction between the environmental law and GATT, then environmental
law should be direct and relevant evidence of the practice of the parties.' 1
As discussed above, this may be a limited, but gap-filling role in the context
of facial compliance with GATT. Presumably, this direct role could include
a range of authority including subsequent agreement, custom, and general
principles of law. Second, public law can influence private law in a number
188 See ISO Standards Would Encourage Compliance with Environmental Standards,
Official Says, supra note 181, at 283, The ISO 14000 standards form two categories, "one
for evaluating an organization and another for assessing its products." Id.
1"9 See Allison Lucas & Michael Roberts, Environmental Management Standard Set for
1995 Debut; Manufacturers Seek to Merge Auditing Schemes, CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 9,
1994, at 33.
190 Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 82, at 91.
191 A clear example of this was seen when French President Frangois Mitterand invoked
Article 128 of the Treaty of Maastricht in defending statutes designed to protect French
culture from a challenge under GATT. See Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in
Audiovisual Entertainment: A Proposal for Counteracting the European Union's Trade
Barriers to the US. Entertainment Industry's Exports, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563, 577
(1995), available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, ALLNWS File.
192 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 1, at 20 & n.46.
193 See Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 218.
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of indirect ways. For example, the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development sparked the creation of ISO 14000 as a new
environmental standard to work towards sustainable industrial
development. 94 Similarly, municipal environmental law can influence
international industrial standards; ISO 14000 has embraced the theme of the
U.S. Pollution Prevention Act. 95 In this fashion, environmental notions may
enter GATT through the back door of harmonization. In addition, the
interests that drove the creation of environmental law are no less compelling
after the Uruguay Round. These concerns can govern the conduct of GATT
member states in their dealings outside of a dispute. For example, it is
unlikely that a nation would be willing to pit GATT against a popular
environmental treaty, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. 6 The political costs would be too high. As a final
note, because the role of non-GATT law is limited in GATT disputes, it is
referred to as mere interpretive principles; perhaps one day an audacious
defendant will confront this parochial aspect of GATT with an argument
based on international custom. 97
2. International Environmental Law
The policies of international environmental protection are diverse; the
principles may be articulable, but their application is complex.'98 At a
minimum, a state materially harmed by activities clearly traceable to another
state may be able to recover. 99 In the realm of international agreements,
notions of ecological responsibility have intruded on the anthropocentric
concept of maximum use.2" Some of these environmental notions grow from
4 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 501.
"I The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,101-13,109 (1994). "The
Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that pollution
should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible .... ." Id. § 13,101(b); see
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 164, at 505.
196 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541 (1987); see Kingsbury, supra note 10, at 218-19.
197 Cf. I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, 1(b), (c), supra note 26.
'9' See PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1009-12.
' See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
200 See HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 340-4 1.
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the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.2 1' These include a duty to
prevent a known harm or risk (a duty that has evolved to include potential
harms or risks),202 a duty to prevent crises,0 3 and a duty to notify other
nations of environmental risks.2" At the same time, there is an increasing
trend towards a holistic environmental management in which nations and
industry cooperate to avoid risks,2°5 making "environmental protection ... an
integral part of the development process. '206 In short, international law
provides several principles relevant to Article 27.2: a closer coordination of
development with environmental protection and a precautionary principle that
seeks to identify and account for imperfect knowledge. These principles
support the coordination of environmental considerations with the decision
to grant a patent by requiring the applicant to make a pre-market showing of
safety.
a. The Coordination of Development and Protection of the Environment
It is a historic principle of international law to coordinate
development with environmental protection. Any effort to segregate the two
issues misunderstands their relationship. The very failure to consider the
environmental effects of development led to the early cases of international
environmental law. In the Lac Lanoux Arbitration, the dispute arose over the
potential of adverse environmental effects caused by France's development
of its water interests in the Carol River.20 7 The Trail Smelter Case concerned
transboundary pollution from a Canadian lead smelting operation that injured
the U.S. environment.0 ' By the very nature of the dispute, international law
20! Cf Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949) (finding that one should
use one's property in such a manner as not to injure that of another). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601 (1987) for a concise
explanation of these duties.
202 See HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 341; see, e.g., The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, June 13, 1992, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
203 See HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 342; see, e.g., Convention on Assistance in the Case
of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986).
204 See HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 341-43.
20. See id. at 342-45; PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1034-37.
206 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, princ. 4.
207 Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
20' Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
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regularly has commingled the interests of development and the need for
environmental protection.
This principle permeates the growth of public environmental law,
starting with the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. 20 9 Prior
agreements had dealt primarily with the allocation of resources. 210 Yet the
Stockholm conference recognized a need for principles governing more than
this, principles that would enable states to cooperate in both development and
the preservation of natural resources.21  The principle reappears in
subsequent international statements such as the World Charter for Nature, 2
the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, 1 3 and Agenda
2124 Interestingly, public environmental law contemplates the issue of
international trade and seeks to clear the field of protectionist municipal law:
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral
actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided.
Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based
on international consensus.21 5
Yet at the same time, the Rio Declaration cautions that any development
policy that does not include sound environmental policy is itself unsound.21 6
As shown above, environmental concerns symmetrically have entered
209 See HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 34-35; cf PLATER ET AL., supra note 27,
at 1001-02.
210 See, e.g., Agreement with Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
211 See id.; see, e.g, Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, Report of the U.N. Conf. on the Human Environment, July 5-16,
1972, princ. 18, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972), I1 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
... World Charterfor Nature, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 5 1, at 21, addendum 1,
U.N. Doc. A/37iL.4 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 455 (1983).
23 Rio Declaration, supra note 202.
214 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/4 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
21' Rio Declaration, supra note 202, princ. 12.
216 See id. princ. 4.
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international law concerning development. The Uruguay Round negotiations
established a Committee on Trade and the Environment "to identify the
relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in order
to promote sustainable development. ' 12 7 The statement further noted that
there need not be "any policy contradiction between upholding and
safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading
system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the
environment, . . . on the other. '2 t8 Moreover, the general exceptions of
GATT voice this symmetry by express accommodation of those trade
restrictions that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health. 21 9
The plain language of TRIPS is consistent with the coordination of
development and environmental protection. TRIPS purports to set minimum
standards in the definition of intellectual property rights. 20 If the
environmental exception is read out of the document, the foundation of the
plain language is rendered meaningless-the Article would no longer be a
working procedure, but a hortatory afterthought. This is necessarily so
because the broad grant of Article 27.1 is made subject to paragraph 2. The
exceptions must be taken with the broad definition or the liberal grant also
becomes hortatory. The plain language and the structure of the Article
clearly overcome any argument that patent law should remain free of
environmental concerns.
b. The Precautionary Principle
Current public environmental law supports scientific risk avoidance
in the interest of environmental protection, but early on, uncertainty was not
recognized as a major aspect of environmental science. In 1972, the
Stockholm Declaration provided that "[s]cience and technology... must be
applied to the identification, avoidance and control of environmental
risks ... for the common good of mankind.""22 Yet to effect this goal, the
Stockholm Convention required only a "free flow of up-to-date scientific
217 Committee on Trade and the Environment, Ministerial Decision of Apr. 14, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1267 (1994).
218 Id.
219 GAT', supra note 1, art. XX(b).
220 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl.
21 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 211, princ. 18.
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information and transfer of experience. '22 The cautionary approach evolved
in later multilateral environmental agreements. The World Charter for
Nature provides that: "Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk
to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents
shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature,
and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities
should not proceed. ' 2 a Particularly relevant are the provisions relating to
chemical wastes: "Discharge of pollutants into natural systems shall be
avoided and... [s]pecial precautions shall be taken to prevent discharge of
radioactive or toxic wastes. 2 24 Logically, this means that special precautions
should apply to potentially toxic materials, including if needed, a ban on
production or importation. Importantly, the burden is on the proponent to
show that prior to production, the adverse effects are "fully understood" and
that the benefits "outweigh potential damage to nature. 225 Inherent in these
special precautions is the prerequisite that citizens be given "appropriate
access" to information concerning the environment.22 6 This compelling
principle is reflected in the international standards discussed above.
In 1992, the Rio Declaration gave the precautionary principle an even
clearer voice. Principle 15 provides that: "In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States .... Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. '227 Accordingly,
this principle informs many aspects of modem environmental law.228 In
1993, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic embraced the precautionary principle as requiring
"preventive measures ... when there are reasonable grounds for concern" of
pollution that "directly or indirectly... may bring about hazards to human
222 Id. princ. 20.
223 World Charter for Nature, supra note 212, princ. 11 (b).
224 Id. princ. 12.
22 Id. princ. 11.
226 See Rio Declaration, supra note 202, princ. 10; HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 320.
227 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, princ. 15.
See Agenda 21, supra note 214, arts. 2.10, 2.22, 4.19, 4.22, 4.26, 5.16, 8.1, 19.1, 20.1,
21.1, 22.1, 30.1, 31.1, 35.1, 36.8, 40.1.
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health [or] harm living resources. '  This statement requires action even
with imperfect knowledge. Typically, obligations under the precautionary
principle are "unconditional [and] triggered by mere prima facie cases of
risks and, thus, independent[] of costs/economic criteria and of proofs of
thresholds, causality and full scientific certainty. 230 It is worth note that the
legal status of these multilateral environmental agreements varies widely.
For example, the World Charter for Nature is considered to be "politically
binding" overall with legally binding aspects which have been incorporated
into subsequent U.N. documents.231 However, in terms of an accepted
interpretive principle, the message is clear.
Also worth note is that international environmental law requires
exporting nations to disclose information about known, dangerous chemicals
to importing nations.232 In 1987, the United Nations Environmental Program
convened a group of experts to produce guidelines to improve the exchange
of information available for chemicals in international trade.233 The product
was the London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals
in International Trade, as amended in 1989.234 The United Nations further
supports the domestic restriction and ban of chemicals by publishing an
annual report of affected chemicals and the acting governments.2" The
London Guidelines require the national exporter of a chemical to disclose
information on the chemical being imported, the reasons for the restrictions
or ban, and any alternatives to the chemical.236 It is indeed true that "[e]fforts
to control uncertain hazards almost always involve an increase in government
restriction of private conduct. Some degree of freedom, usually of an
economic nature, must be sacrificed for the sake of protecting the community
2 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
done at Paris Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993).
230 HOHMANN, supra note 165, at 341.
21 See id. at 180.
232 See MICHAEL S. BARAM & DANIEL G. PARTAN, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 191-92 (1990) (citing London Guidelines for the Exchange of
Information on Chemicals in International Trade, U.N. Envtl. Program, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC. 14/17 (1987)).
233 See id.
234 London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International
Trade, U.N. Envtl. Program, UN Doc. UNEP/GC. 14/17 (1987) as amended, adopted by
UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/30 (May 25, 1989) [hereinafter London Guidelines].
235 See BARAM & PARTAN, supra note 232, at 192.
236 See London Guidelines, supra note 234.
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at large. 237
In these examples, the international community is shown as accepting
the precautionary principle. Such broad acceptance would compel a gap-
filling interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2 that permits a nation to require a
showing of safety prior to national treatment.
3. Municipal Law
a. Patent Law
The history and the variety of municipal systems provide some
support for the proposition that a dangerous invention is not useful to society
and, therefore, is not appropriate subject matter for a patent.23 For example,
early U.S. cases held that a finding of social harm, which was defined as
being "injurious to the morals, the health and the good order of society,"
rendered an invention unpatentable.239 The principle derives from an early
British patent statute, which excluded otherwise patentable inventions that
were "contrary to the law,. . . mischievous to the State, by raising prices of
commodities at home,. . . or generally inconvenient."2" The modem concept
sees the legal requirement of utility24' to be composed of both a positive and
negative utility.242 For an invention to be patentable, its positive utility must
outweigh its negative utility. 43 In practice in most countries, the
consideration of negative utility is manifested as an exception to patentable
subject matter.244 Many nations retain this ability to exclude patents that are
237 MATTES, supra note 48, at 14.
23' See 1 ERNESTBAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 5:12 (1984) (citing
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568)).
239 Id.
240 1 LADAS, supra note 52, § 4 (quoting the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. I, ch. III
(1623)).
241 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining utility as "[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof').
242 See 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 238, § 5:12.
243 See id.
244 See, e.g., PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD S-32.2 (Alan J. Jacobs ed., 4th ed. 1996)
(explaining that the Slovak Republic excludes from patentable subject matter "inventions
that are contrary to principle of humanity and public morality").
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contrary to morality or social benefit;2 45 indeed, Article 27 of TRIPS
accommodates this consideration of negative utility.246 Nevertheless, some
nations, including the United States, have discarded this notion.
Although early U.S. patent law embraced the concept of negative
utility, modem cases have rejected it. In its place, the courts seem to support
a concept of beneficial or nominal utility; that is, a nominal showing of
beneficial use is enough for patentability in the United States, regardless of
the negative effects. The transformation in the U.S. concept of utility is
striking. One early Supreme Court case held that where the inventor finds it
necessary to reach his objective through risky (imminently dangerous) means,
then the patenting of that invention exceeds the intent of Congress.247 In the
twentieth century, the test for utility evolved into whether the invention is
"used or is designed and adapted to be used to accomplish a good result."24
Notably, the U.S. patent statute does not speak to the issue, requiring only
that an invention be "useful. 249 More recently, courts have rejected the past
practice of denying patentability on the grounds of morality, as with
gambling devices, or because the invention might injure the health, as with
drug safety.25 Thus, in nations like the United States, any positive social
benefit (for example, industrial) merits reward regardless of the potential
social injury. In contrast to a balancing of positive and negative utility, this
form of utility test might be described as a nominal utility.
However, the U.S. standard is by no means common. Many nations
limit the subject matter of patents because of negative utility; the practice is
widespread and encompasses both developed and developing nations. For
example, in Japan "[i]nventions contrary to public order or morals, or
injurious to health are not patentable."25' Belgium rejects inventions with a
subject matter "the exploitation of which would be contrary to public order
or morals." '252 Likewise, Argentina retains the authority to refuse "inventions
245 See, e.g., id.
246 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.
247 See 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 238, § 5:13 (citing Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. 287
(1874)).
248 1 Id. § 5:12 (citing Mills v. Industry Novelty Co., 230 F. 463 (N.D. Ill. 1963)).
249 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
250 See 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 238, § 5:13 (citing Ex Parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801
(Bd. App. 1977); Application of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
25 PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, supra note 244, at J-6.
252 Id. at B-22.1 to -23.
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contrary to morals." '253 The grounds of rejection seem to range from hygiene
and beneficial custom to public interest.254 The European Patent Convention
also excepts inventions that threaten morality or ordre public. 55
Accordingly, TRIPS accommodates negative utility through
restrictions on patentable subject matter. The terms of the exception are
broad: "to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment." '256 It is telling that there was sufficient support among the
GATT member nations to include this provision when it is clearly contrary
to the municipal law of the United States. TRIPS limits the exception by
forbidding exclusion "merely because the exploitation is prohibited by
domestic law." '257 In other words, a state should be able to supply a non-
protectionist justification for the exclusion. Thus, with the notable exception
of U.S. patent law, a comparison of municipal patent law supports the
precautionary use of Article 27.2.
b. Environmental Law
It is quite common for nations to require, under environmental law,
a showing by industry that its activity will not harm health or the
environment. Indeed, nations customarily place a high burden on the
chemical industry. The burden takes two general forms: industry must either
prove that a new chemical is safe or make some lesser showing. Germany
and Sweden are typical, in that they require the producer to provide sufficient
information for the classification of the new chemical into levels or
categories of toxicity for appropriate regulation.25 Other states burden
industry to a lesser degree. The burden can fall on industry, government, or
someplace in between.
One nation in which more of the burden seems to fall on industry is
France. France regulates the chemical industry by a system of pre-market
2S3 Id. at A-33.
24 See id. at T-2, U-6 (Taiwan and Ukraine, respectively).
255 European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53, reprinted in PATENTS THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD, supra note 244, at App. B-169, -187.
26 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.2. Apparently an Ex Parte Murphy test of
utility would comply with TRIPS.
257 Id.
258 See GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 26.
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controls; chemical manufacturers bear the burden of disclosing to the
Ministry of the Environment the chemical composition, health and
environmental effects during use, and the procedures for safe use.259 There
are grades of toxicity, which drive the extent of disclosure and the regulatory
controls. The most toxic chemicals are subject to a complete prohibition.2"
The European Community has affirmed or motivated much of this regulation
of the chemical industry; for example, EC directives prohibit the marketing
of certain chemical compositions, impose safety measures, and require
regulatory schemes.26" '
In Japan, government and industry seem to share the burden. Industry
is required to report the identity of a chemical to the Ministry of Health and
Welfare prior to manufacture.262 The government then bears the burden to
test the material for risk to health or the environment.263 The method of
control is by permit, and production is forbidden until testing is completed.
264
However, lodging the burden of testing with the government has created
problems. Since the enactment of the law in 1973, industry has reported
6000 new chemicals, of which only 270 have been tested.265 Interestingly,
industry bears a precautionary presumption of risk, which means that there
is no production until government completes the testing.266
In the United States, political and economic concerns weakened pre-
market controls of chemical manufacturing, resulting in a burdened
government. Prior to any legislation addressing the production of toxic
substances, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences warned that "society
suffers large and unnecessary expense because of inadequate investment in
239 See J. ANDREW SCHLICKMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
REGULATION § 2.9, Fr-24 (1995). Note that some French law is derived from European
Community regulations: Law No. 77-771 of July 12, 1977, as modified by Law No. 82-905
of Oct. 21, 1982 and its Decree No. 85-217 of Feb. 13, 1985. See id.
260 See id.
26 See, e.g., Council Directive 79/117, 1979 O.J. (L 033) 36 (prohibition on the placing
on the market and use of plant protection products containing certain active substances);
Council Directive 82/501, 1982 O.J. (L 230) 1 (the "Seveso Directive").
262 See SCHLICKMAN ET AL., supra note 259, § 2.5, Jpn-20-22 (discussing the Law
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determining the hazards of chemicals." '267 Nevertheless, the chemical
industry objected that there would be "serious and unnecessary economic
penalties on the public .... "268 Because of industry protestation and political
might, the legislation produced was weak, complicated, and unworkable.
Industry is merely required to notify government prior to manufacture of a
new chemical.269 The government is required to review the chemical and if
necessary, object by the burdensome process of issuing a regulation. 7 0
In 1994, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
identified over 16,000 existing chemicals that were "of some concern because
of their production volume and chemical structure. 271  With tens of
thousands of chemicals waiting review, EPA has issued regulations to control
only four new and five existing chemicals.2 7 The only U.S. law suitable for
the pre-market control of new industrial use chemicals is the Toxic Substance
Control Act.273 But that legislation burdens the EPA with the requirement of
showing, within ninety days of notification by industry, substantial evidence
that the new chemical poses an "unreasonable risk. 2 74 The U.S. General
Accounting Office recommended shifting the burden to the chemical industry
to show that their products could be consumed safely; this burden should be
a "cost of doing business.2 175 The bottom line is that "TSCA does not require
industry to test new chemicals for their toxicity, and industry generally does
not voluntarily perform this testing. 276
IV. CONCLUSION
It is appropriate under Article 27.2, for a nation to presume that
certain inventions pose an environmental risk. To protect against this risk,
267 COMMITTEE ON PRINCIPLES OF DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMS. IN THE
ENv'T, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS
IN THE ENVIRONMENT 52-53 (1975), in MATTES, supra note 48, at 60.
268 Remarks of W. Driver, President, Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n, quoted in 4
PESTICIDE CHEM. NEWS 13 (1976), in MATTES, supra note 48, at 60.
269 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 27, at 749-50.
270 See id.
271 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
272 See id.
273 See id. at 18.
274 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1994); see GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 9.
275 GAO REPORT, supra note 37, at 40-41.
276 Id. at 32.
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a nation might require a pre-market showing from both domestic and foreign
producers that an invention is safe. If the burden is not carried at all, then
that nation could then ban the invention as unsafe. If an invention fails to
meet a lesser standard of safety, then the nation could discourage its
development by refusing to patent it. If the nation complies with
fundamental GATT policies of the national treatment and most favored
nation rules, then "[t]here is wide agreement in the Group that GATT does
not prevent any contracting party from adopting appropriate domestic
environmental policies by providing countries with very considerable scope
to use trade-related policies to protect national environmental resources
without calling into question their GATT obligations .... 27
The example at hand envisions two responses by the applicant.278
Depending on the subject matter of the invention, a patent applicant could
rebut the presumption of risk by a showing that the use of the invention,
including its ultimate disposal, would not threaten "human, animal or plant
life or health," nor pose a "serious prejudice to the environment. '279 In the
alternative, the exporting nation of the applicant might challenge this use of
Article 27 as inconsistent with GATT and TRIPS. Such a challenge would
present a question of gap-filling interpretation. The complaining nation
would identify the relevant terms of reference from GATT and TRIPS,
though the ultimate decision could incorporate other provisions.28 °
The defending nation could resort to two general arguments in the
alternative.2s 1 Fundamental policy conflicts are not implicated by this
example so the defense is guided by facial compliance with GATT and
TRIPS.
1. The GATTsystem supports the precautionary use of TRIPS Article 27.2.
If the safety standards are scientifically valid, and the trade
mechanism is in accord with basic GATT policy, then the problem becomes
more refined. The TBT Agreements invoke international standards as
277 GEMIT Report, supra note 12, at 79.
278 Inaction or alternative dispute resolution are certainly available alternatives. However,
they intersect with the topic of this paper only inasmuch as the principles of law might guide
their conduct.
279 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 27.2.
280 See 1 PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 23, pt. 2, at 12-13.
28! This example neglects a possible GATT article XX argument.
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presumptively compliant with GATT. Both ISO 9000 and ISO 14000
support precaution and life cycle analysis."2 The challenging state must then
overcome a presumption of compliance.
2. General international law accepts precaution and coordination of
environmental protection and development.
The first step in this argument is finding that GATT does not speak
to this issue. The conflict is bound up in GATT and non-GATT law. This
hurdle is jurisdictional.28 a If the dispute settlement panel refers to non-GATT
sources, then it could rely on the contextual consideration of subsequent
agreements, subsequent practice, and to "any relevant rules of international
law applicable to the relations between the parties," including comparative
municipal law.' 4 The second step is to argue the highest level of interpretive
authority. These sources could support arguments both as interpretive
custom or "principles of law recognized by civilized nations.""2 5 Here, it is
clear that international environmental law would support this use of the
precautionary principle and the coordination of environmental and
developmental concerns. Municipal patent law commonly recognizes
limitations on patentable subject matter to serve the public interest. Further,
it is the practice of states to require in municipal law some pre-market control
of inventions, and this use accords with the more successful of those
practices.
V. A FINAL NOTE
It is appropriate to step back and to consider that this recommendation
envisions Article 27.2 as a tool for encouraging responsible industry behavior
at whatever standard a nation should choose. The issues here are very similar
to those that arose in the decision of the United States to embark on pre-
market control of new chemicals:
22 See supra Part III.A.
263 See supra Part II.
284 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 31.3; see Kingsbury,
supra note 10, at 217-27.
285 Cf I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, 1(b)-(c), supra note 26.
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The law's traditional orientation has been one of hindsight,
looking to past conduct and legal relationships to determine
the proper allocation of benefits and responsibilities in a
matter .... The law has hesitated to look forward, to settle
conflicts before they arise. Rather, judges and legislators
have tended to assume, in accordance with the principle of
judicial and legislative restraint, that it is best, or at least more
politic, for the law to deal with problems and injuries only
once they have become manifest.286
Not mentioned in the conclusion above is the role of general international law
in shaping the scope of the dispute. The great weight of non-GATT law
commends precaution in dealing with risk. It is likely that this force will
solidify in both private international standards and public international law.
It is hoped that precaution also will govern state conduct in exploiting the
resources that make not only trade, but life, possible.
286 MATTES, supra note 48, at 12.
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